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Industry Actors, Think Tanks, and Alcohol Policy in the United Kingdom
Benjamin Hawkins, PhD, and Jim McCambridge, PhD
Corporate actors seek to
influence alcohol policies
through various means, in-
cluding attempts to shape
the evidential content of pol-
icy debates. In this case study,
we examined how SABMiller
engaged the think tank Demos
to produce reports on binge
drinking, which were heavily
promoted among policy-
makers at crucial stages in
the development of the UK
government’s 2012 alcohol
strategy.
One key report coincided
with other SABMiller-funded
publications, advocating mea-
sures to enhance parenting as
an alternative to minimum
unit pricing. In this instance,
the perceived independence of
an influential think tank was
used to promote industry in-
terests in tactics similar to
those of transnational to-
bacco corporations.
This approach is in keeping
with other alcohol industry
efforts to marginalize the
peer-reviewed literature. (Am
J Public Health. 2014;104:
1363–1369. doi:10.2105/AJPH.
2013.301858)
ON JULY 17, 2013 THE UK
government announced that it
would not progress plans to in-
troduce a minimum unit pricing
(MUP) for alcohol, which had
been set out in its alcohol strategy
in March 2012.1 This decision
had been widely predicted2 and
followed only days after the an-
nouncement that the introduction
of plain packaging for tobacco
products would be delayed indef-
initely. Trends in key indicators
of alcohol problems have been
rising steeply in Britain, whereas
they have been declining else-
where in Western Europe.3,4
The world’s leading alcohol
scientists recommend increasing
the price of alcohol, through
MUP or other means, as a policy
measure,5 but many sectors of
the alcohol industry strongly op-
pose it.6---8 The decision to halt
implementation of MUP, as with
the delay in implementing plain
packaging for tobacco products,
brought accusations that the gov-
ernment had been unduly inﬂu-
enced by industry actors, includ-
ing David Cameron’s election
strategist Lynton Crosby, whose
consultancy works on behalf of the
tobacco and alcohol industries.9
Following the MUP announce-
ment, prominent individuals and
organizations from the public health
community withdrew from the gov-
ernment’s ﬂagship Responsibility
Deal Alcohol Network, citing exces-
sive industry inﬂuence on policy as
the reason for their decision.10 Pre-
vious studies demonstrate that to-
bacco and alcohol industry actors
exert corporate inﬂuence through
multiple channels, including funding
other bodies to conduct research on
their behalf.7,11
Like the tobacco industry, the
global alcohol industry has
become increasingly concentrated
among a small number of large
multinational producers, which
are among the world’s largest and
most proﬁtable corporations.12
SABMiller is one of the world’s
largest brewers, producing or
marketing more than 200 beer
brands in 75 countries.12 As such,
its policy-inﬂuencing activities
may be similar to those of other
large alcohol industry corpora-
tions.7 Headquartered in London,
SABMiller strongly opposed plans
to introduce MUP in Scotland,
questioning the evidence base for
its effectiveness and declaring
ideological opposition to state
intervention in the market.13 In
opposing MUP, their submission
to the Scottish government’s
consultation on MUP in 2008
claimed that evidence consistently
demonstrated the impact of par-
enting on whether children begin
drinking, although none was pre-
sented or referenced.13
We have presented a case
study of SABMiller’s funding of
research conducted by the think
tank Demos and its attempt to use
this research to inﬂuence policy
debates at crucial stages in the
development and implementation
of the UK government’s alcohol
strategy. Demos describes itself
as “Britain’s leading cross-party
think tank . . . dedicated to
bringing politics closer to the
people.”14
We analyzed the reports pro-
duced along with press releases
and related material published on
the Demos Web site. We moni-
tored further policy-inﬂuencing
activities related to the reports
through regular examination of
the Demos Web site, social media
outputs, and other publications
relating to the project from
2011 to 2012. In addition, we
attended 2 launch events for the
published reports in an observa-
tional capacity and conducted
a semistructured interview with
a Demos employee involved in the
SABMiller-funded work.
ALCOHOL INDUSTRY,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY
INFLUENCE
Attempts to inﬂuence the polit-
ical and regulatory environment
in which businesses operate are
essential components of corporate
strategy.15 The tobacco industry’s
methods of inﬂuencing scientiﬁc
research and policy have been
extensively documented.11 The
few studies of the alcohol industry
show that it has employed similar
tactics at the national, regional,
and global levels.16---20
These include the misrepresen-
tation of scientiﬁc evidence, the
sponsorship of independent
research-funding organizations,
support of university-based scien-
tists, publication of scientiﬁc doc-
uments and support of scientiﬁc
journals, and efforts to inﬂuence
public perceptions of research and
alcohol policies.7,21---23 Funding
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research allows industry actors to
inﬂuence the evidential content of
policy debates while enhancing
their credentials as socially re-
sponsible actors.
THINK TANKS AND POLICY
INFLUENCE
Miller and Harkins24 have sug-
gested that alcohol industry actors
have used think tanks to conduct
research on their behalf. Recent
controversies demonstrate that
sponsoring inﬂuential think tanks
continues to be an important
component of transnational to-
bacco corporations’ political strat-
egy in the United Kingdom.25 At
least 1 of these, the Adam Smith
Institute, has also worked on alco-
hol.26 Think tanks present them-
selves as independent organizations
that conduct research, develop
ideas, and market policy proposals
with the aim of inﬂuencing gov-
ernment.27 They are distinct from
social aspects and public relations
organizations that the alcohol in-
dustry has developed as a key
means of inﬂuencing policy.21,28
Although think tanks’ standing
in policy debates often depends on
their perceived independence,27
they must secure revenue to stay in
existence and industry actors are
potentially important sources of
funding. Using think tanks allows
corporations to draw on their ap-
parent credibility and neutrality,
while distancing industry from the
research they fund and the recom-
mendations they generate.24
UNDER THE INFLUENCE
As the UK government was de-
veloping its alcohol strategy in late
2010, SABMiller commissioned
Demos to conduct research on its
behalf on the social aspects of
binge drinking among those aged
18 to 25 years (Demos employee
interview, July 25, 2011). It was
made clear from the outset that
SABMiller was interested in the
inﬂuence of parenting on alcohol
consumption (Demos employee
interview, July 25, 2011).
A report, Under the Inﬂuence,
was published on September 15,
2011.29 The title is identical to
that Hastings et al. used for their
report on alcohol marketing,
which the British Medical Associ-
ation published in 2009.30 The
ﬁrst part of the report consisted
of a literature review on binge
drinking conducted by Demos
staff that was published initially as
an interim report in March 2011.31
The second part comprised epide-
miological analyses of a UK birth
cohort study conducted by a PhD
student in an unrelated area at
a prestigious British university.
The press release for the report was
released August 28, 2011, some 2
weeks before the publication of
the report, and received signiﬁcant
media attention. However, the
unavailability of the report at this
time precluded any detailed
analysis of the claims made in the
publicity materials. The report was
further publicized at a launch event
held in the Houses of Parliament
on January 24, 2012 (Table 1).
The literature review omitted
the World Health Organization---
sponsored peer-reviewed summary
of the alcohol policy evidence
base5 and accessed instead in-
dustry-funded publications, including
a 2009 Centre for Economics and
Business Research report on MUP
commissioned by SABMiller, along-
side other outputs by the Wine and
Spirit Trade Association7 and 2
alcohol industry social aspects and
public relations organizations: the
International Centre for Alcohol
Policies19 and Drinkaware.28
Under the Inﬂuence frames the
preparatory work commissioned
and undertaken by the UK gov-
ernment on MUP as unsupported
“assertions,” thus ignoring the
underlying evidence base on the
effectiveness of price-based inter-
ventions. This claim is juxtaposed
with a citation of the Centre for
Economics and Business Research
“study” emphasizing that heavier
drinkers were less responsive to
price changes and that MUP would
have little impact on them. The
report reproduces numerous
other anti-MUP arguments made
by alcohol industry actors: the
limited impact on underage
drinkers because of parental sup-
ply, the disproportionate impact
on the poor, the uncertain impacts
on other outcomes of interest, and
the complexities of drinking be-
havior. Like industry actors else-
where,7 the report judges that the
evidence on MUP is “not conclu-
sive.”7(p29) The UK government
subsequently made a commitment
to introduce MUP in its alcohol
strategy published in March 2012
and announced a consultation on
the level at which it would be set.1
Demos organized fringe events
in partnership with SABMiller to
promote the report at all 3 main
political party conferences in au-
tumn 2012. The details of each
event, including the main speakers,
are summarized in Table 2. These
events also presented an addi-
tional SABMiller-funded report
on alcohol pricing by the consul-
tancy ﬁrm London Economics,
subsequently published in De-
cember 2012.32 The key message
of the latter report is that heavier
drinkers are less responsive to
price than are lighter drinkers.
This focus detracts attention from
the fact that despite the lower
TABLE 1—Parliamentary Launch Events for Demos Reports on Alcohol Policy: United Kingdom, 2012
Under the Influence Feeling the Effects
Date January 24, 2012 December 11, 2012
Venue Committee Room 19, Houses of Commons Committee Room 18, Houses of Commons
Chair Fiona Bruce, MP (Conservative) David Goodhart, Demos
Speakers Jamie Bartlett, Demos Jonathan Birdwell, Demos
Christine Thompson, SABMiller Andrew Griffiths, MP (Conservative)
Simon Antrobas, chief executive Addaction
Mary Glover, author of Drugs, Alcohol and Parenting: A Workbook for Parents
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marginal responsiveness to price
changes among heavier drinkers,
it is heavy consumers who will be
most affected by increases in price
because of their higher overall
consumption.33
FEELING THE EFFECTS
The Houses of Parliament
launched a second report by
SABMiller and Demos, Feeling the
Effects, on December 11, 2012. In
addition to the reports by Demos
and London Economics, SABMiller
funded the Centre for Economics
and Business Research to produce
a further report on MUP, also
published in December 2012.34
Three SABMiller-commissioned
reports from 3 different “inde-
pendent” sources were thus pub-
lished in this same month, at a key
moment in the UK government’s
policy deliberations.
Feeling the Effects was written by
different Demos staff members from
those who wrote Under the Inﬂuence,
along with the same PhD student
who had coauthored the previous
report. It presents further analyses of
the same birth cohort data set, along
with a qualitative study of 50 families
affected by problem drinking.35
There is no information provided
about informed consent of partici-
pants or ethical review of this study.
Although other agencies were in-
volved, the treatment charity
Addaction facilitated the ﬁeldwork
for this study and their partnership
was credited on the cover. Addaction
has received sustained funding from
Heineken to support its activities
since 2005, and it features promi-
nently in the brewer’s corporate
social responsibility campaigns.36
There is little explicit content on
MUP in the report, although a
quotation from an unknown source
appears prominently on the cover
suggesting: “Effective parenting is
the best way to call time on
Britain’s binge drinking.”35 The
introduction notes that the UK
government plans to introduce
MUP and brieﬂy refers to argu-
ments by proponents and critics of
the policy, citing a newspaper re-
port and the 2012 London Eco-
nomics report for each of these.
The press release, however, frames
interventions on parenting styles as
a direct alternative to MUP.
It claims on the basis of its “two
year programme of research” that
MUP will have little impact on
problematic and heavy drinkers
and that a focus on parenting
would be more effective than
would MUP in tackling alcohol-
related harm. Elsewhere it goes
even further, claiming, “Focusing
on parenting could be the most
effective way of reducing hazard-
ous drinking levels in the UK”27
(see the box on page e4). These
claims are not within the scope of
the report’s accessed data, and the
conclusions reached cannot be
inferred from the research pre-
sented. Indeed, it is not possible to
identify any rigorous evidence in
the international research litera-
ture to support these contentions.5
Feeling the Effects makes re-
peated references to the activities
of Drinkaware—the alcohol in-
dustry social aspects and public
relations organization28 that un-
dertakes a public information
function on behalf of the UK
government—and its potential fu-
ture role (see the box on page e4).
The report suggests,
There is clearly a signiﬁcant role
for the alcohol industry, which
has a motivation to target those
misusing alcohol to minimize the
harms caused by alcohol.35(p16)
It concludes, “Reducing parental
alcohol misuse must be a priority
for policymakers and those in the
alcohol industry.”35(p55)
It is noteworthy that Drinka-
ware also commissioned research
into the effects of parental alcohol
consumption on children,38 which
mirrors the ﬁndings of Feeling the
Effects and, like the 3 SABMiller
commissioned reports, was pub-
lished in December 2012. SAB-
Miller claims on its Web site that
it was “the ﬁrst company to spon-
sor Drinkaware.”39
Under the Inﬂuence and Feeling
the Effects were among the ﬁrst
materials to be placed in the
“knowledge bank” on Drinka-
ware’s Web site. A SABMiller-
sponsored event on local
responses to alcohol-related harm
was held at the 2013 Labour
Party conference.40 Advertised
speakers at the event included
Elaine Hindal, the chief executive
of Drinkaware.
Both launch events for the re-
ports in parliament were widely
publicized through the Demos
Web site and through social me-
dia. In addition, the Feeling the
Effects event was publicized on the
SABMiller Web site via a blog post
by Christine Thompson, UK
government relations manager,
TABLE 2—Party Conference Fringe Events: United Kingdom, 2012
Liberal Democrat Labour Conservative
Date September 25, 2012 October 1, 2012 October 9, 2012
Venue Hilton Metropole, Brighton Premier Inn, Manchester Jurys Inn, Birmingham
Speakers John Pugh, MP, cochair Liberal Democrat Parliamentary
Policy Committee on Health and Social Care
Diane Abbott, MP, shadow minister for Public Health Fiona Bruce, MP, All-Party Parliamentary Group on
Alcohol Misuse
Jonathan Birdwell, head of the Citizens Project, Demos
Jonathan Birdwell, head of the Citizens Project, Demos
Jonathan Birdwell, head of the Citizens Project, Demos
Patrice Muller, senior partner, London Economics
Patrice Muller, senior partner, London Economics
Patrice Muller, senior partner, London Economics
Emma Vandore, associate, Demos
Simon Antrobas, chief executive, Addaction
Emma Vandore, associate, DemosClare Gerada, chair, Royal College of General Practitioners
Laura Donnelly, health correspondent, The Daily Telegraph
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who had delivered a presentation
at the launch of Under the Inﬂu-
ence. In contrast to the Demos
press release, this blog post did not
include any discussion of MUP.41
Senior ﬁgures from other industry
groups such as Drinkaware and its
parent body, the Portman Group,
attended the launch events.28 The
ﬁnancial support of SABMiller
was acknowledged in both Under
the Inﬂuence and Feeling the Effects
and in the notes to editors of the
accompanying press releases
(although not in their summary
of Under the Inﬂuence on the
Demos Web site).
Neither of the 2 SABMiller-
funded reports by Demos nor any
part of either has been published
in a peer-reviewed journal. We
encourage readers to examine
directly the limitations of the
epidemiological analyses in both
reports and of the qualitative
study presented in the second
report.
SOBERING UP
In November 2013, Demos
published a further report on al-
cohol, funded by the Association
of Convenience Stores, a retail
sector trade association.42 The
report repeatedly claims that the
UK government rejected MUP
because of a lack of supporting
evidence. In keeping with the
industry-favored approach, it calls
for industry self-regulation and
partnership between the retail
sector and a range of service pro-
viders and education and infor-
mation campaigns.
The report cites the other
SABMiller-funded outputs as
evidence of the importance of
parenting. Cross-referencing dem-
onstrates how industry-funded
reports become mutually rein-
forcing, leading to the formation
of a methodologically ﬂawed and
highly biased but internally con-
sistent parallel literature to the
international peer-reviewed scien-
tiﬁc literature.19,43
INFLUENCING THE POLICY
PROCESS
The decision of one of the
world’s leading alcohol producers
to fund “research” undertaken by
a think tank is similar to wider
alcohol and tobacco industry tac-
tics to inﬂuence the evidential
content of policy debates.21---23
Apart from the work of Miller
and Harkins,24 the use of this
particular tactic has not been high-
lighted in the scientiﬁc literature in
relation to the alcohol industry.
From the outset the parameters of
the SABMiller and Demos project
were circumscribed, focusing on
issues in keeping with the policy
preferences and business interests
of the funder.
Published reports neglected
policy interventions that the in-
ternational evidence base suggests
are the most likely to be effective
in reducing alcohol consumption
and harm.5 Notwithstanding the
limitations of these reports, their
relevance to ongoing policy de-
bates was explicitly and forcefully
articulated in ways designed to
inﬂuence thinking about, and
decision-making on, MUP. They
were launched at the heart of
government and promoted at the
conferences of the 3 largest United
Kingdom---wide political parties.
SABMiller’s engagement of
Demos and other research orga-
nizations is reminiscent of trans-
national tobacco corporations’ use
of front organizations.44 Other
tactics used here—including the
targeting of junior researchers
and prestigious universities and
the apparent attempt to marginal-
ize the peer-reviewed scientiﬁc
literature by creating a parallel
literature—have previously been
used by the alcohol industry else-
where.19,21,23 Although there is
Key Extracts From the Demos Reports
Extracts From the Demos Press Release for Feeling the Effects Extracts From Feeling the Effects on Drinkaware
On the basis of a 2-year program of research into the causes and culture of hazardous drinking,
researchers conclude that the government’s planned policy of minimum pricing will have
minimal impact on consumption by problematic and heavy drinkers.
“Drinkaware’s advice to parents is the correct approach and should be continued.
However, leading companies in the alcohol industry should do more to coordinate and
spearhead information awareness campaigns aimed at parents. They could do this
through a national level campaign and targeted local area campaigns in the UK or at the
European level through the EU Alcohol and Health Forum [another industry body]. At
a strategic level, in devising these campaigns and effective messages, advertising
companies that have worked on behaviour change campaigns—including the Drinkaware
campaign—should be brought in as stakeholders and consultants, alongside the
government’s Behaviour Change Unit.”35(p58)
Instead, new research from Demos suggests that a policy focus on parenting style and drinking
habits in front of children would be more effective than is minimum pricing in creating
a responsible drinking culture.
Because of the impact of parenting style on children—and the impact of parental alcohol
consumption on parenting style—Demos argues that helping parents to be better, more
effective parents—especially those with alcohol problems—may be the best approach to
reduce levels of hazardous drinking in the United Kingdom.
Jonathan Birdwell, author of the report and head of the Citizens Program at Demos said:
“The Prime Minister has said that Britain’s binge drinking culture needs to be ‘attacked from
every angle’ but the policy proposals tend to be limited to technocratic solutions like
minimum pricing. Our research suggests that focusing on parenting could be the most
effective way of reducing hazardous drinking levels in the UK, especially in the long-term.”37
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evidence of coordination between
tobacco and alcohol industry ac-
tivities in previous decades,45
SABMiller is more closely con-
nected to the tobacco industry than
are other alcohol producers.46,47
Philip Morris controlled the
then Miller Brewing Company for
30 years and still retains a signiﬁ-
cant shareholding in SABMiller.47
Internal company documents
reveal that they supported the es-
tablishment of International Cen-
tre for Alcohol Policies as a global
actor principally concerned with
managing efforts at regulation.19
It is also noteworthy that the
Centre for Economics and Busi-
ness Research has also produced
a report funded by Phillip Morris
on the allegedly negative eco-
nomic consequences of plain
packaging of tobacco products.48
More recently, SABMiller has
been exposed as the author of the
alcohol policies of 4 sub-Saharan
African countries.49
It is not possible to know now
whether this makes SABMiller
atypical of alcohol industry actors
in their approach to the use of
evidence to inﬂuence policy.
However, concerns about corpo-
rate subversion of science are not
restricted to the tobacco and al-
cohol industries; funding effects
are a well-established source of
bias for both pharmaceutical50
and nutrition research.51 It is thus
necessary to study the activities of
corporations in this area carefully,
across sectors of the industry,
across industries, and at the do-
mestic and international levels.
This need has been recognized as
requiring forms of knowledge gen-
eration that transcend traditional
academic disciplines with novel,
theoretically informed research
designs and methodologies.20,23
The Association of Convenience
Stores’ funding of the report sug-
gests that the work conducted on
behalf of SABMiller was not an
isolated case for Demos. Rather, it
points to a wider acceptance of
alcohol industry actors as a legiti-
mate source of research funding
for this organization. If thinks tanks
such as Demos are to contribute to
the evidence base on public poli-
cies, they must manage better the
tensions inherent in commercial
sponsorship of their activities. Both
reports include the statement that
for Demos “our unique approach
challenges the traditional ‘ivory
tower’ model of policymaking by
giving a voice to people and com-
munities.”
This makes Demos vulnerable to
corporations seeking to undermine
policy-relevant scientiﬁc evidence
that does not suit their business
interests, especially in areas such as
alcohol, where Demos does not
possess the internal expertise to
undertake this type of research.
Because of its own professed ideals
of bridging the gap between politi-
cal leaders and ordinary voters in
key contemporary political debates,
this episode provides much for
Demos to consider.14
As early as March 2013 media
reports began to emerge that the
government had abandoned plans
to implement MUP, some 4
months before the policy change
was formally announced.2 The
absence of transparency in UK
alcohol policymaking means that it
is not possible to assess how far
the activities we have detailed, or
additional inﬂuencing activities by
other industry actors, have been
responsible for the UK govern-
ment’s decision to abandon MUP.
Other activities included the Why
Should Responsible Drinkers Pay
More campaign (and the associated
Web site) coordinated by the
Wine and Spirit Trade Associa-
tion52 and supported by leading
UK supermarkets along with
producer organizations such as
SABMiller.
The formal announcement of
the decision to halt plans for MUP
implementation accessed a lack of
evidence that MUP would achieve
desired reductions in alcohol
harms and spurious alcohol in-
dustry concerns about the effects
of MUP on moderate consumers:
We do not yet have enough
concrete evidence that its intro-
duction would be effective in re-
ducing harms associated with
problem drinking—this is a cru-
cial point—without penalising
people who drink responsibly.53
The public health community
widely criticized and industry actors
welcomed the decision to stop
MUP.54 The timing and justiﬁcation
for the decision are particularly
noteworthy because the explicit aim
of the preceding consultation was to
canvass views on the level at which
the minimum price per unit should
be set, not to establish whether
MUP should be implemented at all.1
The UK government’s alcohol
strategy has described the available
evidence as follows:
There is strong and consistent evi-
dence that an increase in the price
of alcohol reduces the demand for
alcohol which in turn can lead to
a reduction in harm, including for
those who regularly drink heavily
and young drinkers under 18.1
Despite industry claims to the
contrary, the accumulating
evidence base in support of MUP
was more substantial when the
policy was halted than when the
initial decision to implement it was
ﬁrst announced.55,56 Because of
the circumstances in which the de-
cision on MUP was made, the per-
ception exists that the UK govern-
ment has subordinated concerns
about public health to powerful
vested interests. Members of the
main party within the UK govern-
ment have forcefully articulated this
view.57
We encourage the research
community to investigate these
issues further. In addition, there is
a particular responsibility for
health policymakers to facilitate
such investigations to ascertain
whether, and to what extent, large,
powerful corporations are sub-
verting evidence-based public
health. Easily accessible publication
of documents, including records of
meetings with industry actors and
full declaration of conﬂicts of in-
terests for all policy-relevant actors,
could be the ﬁrst step toward
achieving this. j
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